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Abstract
The past 30 years has witnessed a worldwide decrease in real interest rates. Simul-
taneously over this period house prices have grown in real terms. We demonstrate that
these trends can be explained by changes in demographic structure associated with the
introduction of the pill in the early 1970s. Following this, most of the western world,
Japan and China saw similar reductions in fertility rates, though timing and magnitude
differ among countries. In the long-run this leads to lower population growth. In the
short-run the cohort born just before the introduction of the pill are disproportionally
larger than cohorts born before and after. As this large cohort accumulates assets
for retirement, aggregate savings supply increases which results in falling real interest
rates and rising house prices. We find that an increase in house prices over the past
decades was likely an efficient outcome that aided efficiency in the transition towards
the new balanced growth path. However, housing’s appreciation is a feature that can’t
be easily explained in a rational framework. Our model predicts that real interest rates
will continue to fall, overshooting the new balanced growth path level until hitting a
trough at around the year 2035.
1 Introduction
The fall in real interest rates experienced in the past several decades has been an area
of intense academic debate in recent years. Real interest rates have been negative in the
United States and the Euro-zone since 2008. This has important implications for returns
on investment, financial stability, and also the operation of monetary policy subject to the
zero lower bound, see Teulings and Baldwin (2015) for an overview of the Secular Stagnation
debate. Simultaneous to the fall in real interest rates, house prices have grown substantially
in real terms, see Knoll, Schularick, and Steger (2014). This house price growth has led to
housing becoming the largest single asset on a household’s balance sheet, see Piketty (2014).
In this paper we show that changes in demographic structure due to the introduction of the
pill can explain simultaneously the fall in real interest rates and the rise in house prices over
the past decades. The cohort born just before the introduction of the pill are far greater in
size than the cohorts born before and after. Hence, the age composition of the population
deviates strongly from the composition in the balanced growth path either before or after
the introduction of the pill. This leads to a disruption in the life-cycle saving patterns of
the overlapping generations, which can explain the fall in real interest rates and the rise in
house prices.
The pill was first approved by the US Food and Drug Administration in 1960, however
it took until the late sixties before its use was widely spread among the young female pop-
ulation, see Goldin and Katz (2002). It led to massive and sharp decline in fertility rates
across most developed countries, by about 30% or more roughly around the year 1970 (see
our discussion in section 2). The fall in fertility had corresponding effects on cohort size.
Some 20 to 25 years later, the event had an echo effect, when the first cohort of mothers born
after the introduction of the pill were supposed to give birth to the next generation. Since
these post-pill cohorts were 30% smaller than their pre-pill predecessors, cohort size dropped
again by some 30%. As a consequence, cohorts born after 1990 were about half the size
of the large cohort born before 1970, although the exact numbers differ somewhat between
countries depending on the exact pattern in fertility, the age of giving birth and migration.
Since the population was growing rather rapidly in most countries in the decades before, the
large cohort born between 1964 and 1968 are far greater than cohorts born before and after.
The current composition of the population deviates therefore strongly from the distribution
in any balanced growth path, whether a pyramid (in the case of a growing population) or
an inverted pyramid (in the case of a shrinking population).
Because cohorts seek to smooth consumption across their life-cycles, a cohort saves during
the years it is active on the labor market, first to repay the (implicit) debt build up during
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early stage of life for the accumulation of human capital, and then to accumulate assets to
finance their consumption after retirement. The desired asset-holding by a generation is at its
peak around the age of retirement (around 65 in most countries). In a balanced growth path,
this life-cycle pattern in the asset accumulation of any cohort is smoothly accommodated
by the other cohorts which are in a different stages of their life-cycles. The large cohort
currently aged between 45 and 49 disrupts this accommodating process. These cohorts are
accumulating assets to finance their future consumption, while the usual absorbers of these
savings, the retirees and the youngsters, are in short supply. Our analysis shows that the
saving of this large cohort can explain the pattern of falling real interest rates. Our model
predicts negative real interest rates in 2016, as is observed empirically. In fact, our model
suggests that this downward trend will continue for another decade and half, overshooting
the new balanced growth path level until hitting a trough around the year 2035. After 2035
the large cohort begins to retire and deplete their savings, thus reversing the trend of high
savings, and eventually the real interest rate tends towards the new balanced growth path
level. Note that Japan has an earlier large cohort, those born in the baby boom immediately
after the Second World War. This cohort is so numerous that they dominate Japan’s age
distribution even in the year 2016. For this reason, Japan’s age distribution leads that of the
western world by about 15 years, and likewise our analysis when applied to Japan will occur
15 years earlier. In this sense, Japan’s experience over the past two decades provides a good
laboratory for countries whose large cohorts are 15 years younger, for example Germany.
Samuelson (1958) was the first to derive the balanced growth path relation between the
growth rate g and the return to capital r in an economy with overlapping generations of
workers and retirees. Under some assumptions (see section 4), the rate of return to capital
is equal to the growth rate: r = g. For our purpose, nothing is lost in considering a world
without technological progress. In such a world, g is the growth of the workforce, which is
equal to the growth rate of the population in a balanced growth path. The introduction of
the pill reduced the long-run constant rate of population growth g, which shall eventually
lead to a lower return to capital r due to the r = g relation. The transition to the new
balanced growth path equilibrium is however non-trivial. The cohort size distribution carries
memory and generates persistence; the enormous size of the large cohort born before the
pill makes our demography of population more biased towards saving than any balanced
growth path. Some 60 years after the introduction of the pill, this large cohort holds a large
stock of assets to finance their future consumption. Hence, the supply of capital exceeds
its demand during this episode, resulting in a fall in the real interest rate that overshoots
the new balanced growth path level. Although this overshooting transitory, it is of first
order importance as it lasts for several decades. The lower the elasticities of intertemporal
2
substitution in consumption and of substitution between capital and labor, the larger this
effect. The empirical literature suggests these elasticities to be less than unity, in the order
of magnitude of a half (see Chirinko (2004) and Havra´nek (2015)). Using these values, our
calculations show that after an initial increase at the arrival of the shock, r falls gradually
to a minimum that is about 2% below the new steady-value g. The trough in real interest
rates occurs around 2035, some 65 years after the introduction of the pill.
An r = g balanced growth path always exists, moreover this growth path will maxi-
mize the utility of the representative generation. However although the resource availability
constraint is met every period, this outcome cannot be implemented easily as a market equi-
librium. The critical condition that separates whether the market can generate the r = g
equilibrium asks whether the total net asset demand (across all cohorts) can be met by the
size of the capital stock. When the size of the capital stock is insufficient to meet the demand
of the saving cohorts, there is a problem of asset shortage and the economy is dynamically
inefficient (with r < g). There are several solutions to this problem, some of them enforced
by the government, i.e. either sovereign debt or a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system,
or we can have trade in bubbly assets, which is implemented by the market. Bubbly assets
do not necessarily generate a real dividend but carry a positive price only because buyers
expect these assets to carry a positive price in the future, see Tirole (1985). The possibility
of trade in bubbly asset provides a market solution to the problem of dynamic efficiency.
A bubble of the right size can provide sufficient assets to solve the asset shortage problem,
thereby returning to the r = g equilibrium.
We find that due the savings of the large cohort, there is a heightened period of acute
asset shortage. This acute asset shortage requires a larger bubble to accommodate, and hence
the growth of a bubble during this transition period is an efficient and perhaps unsurprising
response to the introduction of the pill. The consumption smoothing of the large cohort
comes as a cost. Due to the growth of the bubble, the large cohort buys the bubbly asset
at an inflated price from the previous generation. This results in the previous generation
earning a windfall profit in return for providing the supply of the bubbly asset. We may
think of this windfall profit as a consumption smoothing tax that the large cohort pay for the
service of using the bubble, however the large cohort is nonetheless better off as without this
bubble they suffer even due to the lack of store of value. Although a larger bubble during
this transition period may indeed be an efficient outcome that is sustainable under rational
expectations (see our section 3), the appreciation of such a bubble is a feature that cannot be
easily explained in rational framework. In particular rational bubbles without uncertainty
appreciate at the real interest rate, however in our experience, and in our model in section
3, we see a fall in the real interest rate simultaneous to an acceleration of growth for the
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bubble. For the purpose of our analysis, we content ourselves to offer an explanation for the
fundamental driving forces behind the growth of bubbles. There are plausible explanations
for the growth puzzle, for example speculative expectations or a process of learning, however
it remains an open question that we remain agnostic towards from the perspective of this
paper.
In practice, housing, in particular the land on which it is built, is an excellent candidate
to serve as a bubbly asset. The supply of land is largely fixed, which is a favorable feature
for a bubbly asset. Then, our analysis demonstrating the crucial role of bubbly assets during
the transition phase has important policy implications. Policy makers and economists alike
frequently voice worries about the increase house prices that have occurred in almost all
countries since 1970, see Shiller (2007). They reason that these price increases are a bubble,
usually interpreted as an irrational phenomenon that will lead to future disaster when the
bubble bursts. However, the bubble in the value of housing may not be so irrational, serving
the role of a store of value during the transition phase. Indeed, rational bubbles (without
uncertainty) do not burst, although they may deflate gradually, contrary to a sudden collapse
that characterizes irrational bubbles. This fits our general experience of long-standing house
price appreciation over the past several decades. During episodes of low returns to regular
investment, the purchase of bubbly assets is an efficient way to transact the intertemporal
transfer of consumption between generations. In many definitions, Secular Stagnation is just
that, a prolonged period of low returns to investment. Trying to avoid bubbles to pop up
will just block the opportunity for cohorts to smooth their consumption over the life-cycle.
Cohorts will seek alternative means to do so, potentially at higher cost. Hence in our view,
an increase in the value of a bubbly asset such as housing is just a natural phenomenon
during the transition to a lower rate of population growth.
Several past studies have looked to investigate the effect of demographics on real interest
rates and house prices. Teulings and Gottfries (2015) argue that the increase in life ex-
pectancy not offset by an increase in the retirement age has raised savings supply. If this
additional savings supply was directed to housing, it could explain the increase in house
prices over the past decades. Rachel and Smith (2015) find that changes in demography
has resulted in changes to the support ratio, the ratio of workers to the overall population.
Taking an estimate for the elasticity of savings supply with respect to the support ratio,
they estimate that demographic factors can lead to an increase in savings supply accounting
for a 0.9% fall of real interest rates. Carvalho, Ferrero and Nechio (2016) make a similar
argument and find that they can account for a reduction in the natural rate of interest of
1.5%. Goodhart and Erfurth (2014) consider future support ratios and project that support
ratios will fall in the future, thereby reversing the period of high savings and low interest
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rates. They predict that by 2025 real interest rates shall return to their historical norm of
2.5-3%. Mankiw and Weil (1989) consider life-cycle variation in the demand for housing and
thus the implications of demographic change on house prices. They project that house price
growth will slow from the 1990s onwards. Bakshi and Chen (1994) extend their analysis to
consider the effect of demographics on the capital market as a whole and its implications
for real interest rates. While the above studies vary in their approach, their analyses all
have in common the limitation of being static or steady state in some fashion. Consider
an analysis based on the level of the support ratio, which argues that within a steady state
equilibrium high support ratios correspond to low real interest rates. Although this steady
state argument broadly captures the direction of the demographic change, it misses the mag-
nitude and the rich dynamics of the demographic transition. Contrast this with our model,
where the main results are derived precisely from the dynamic transition outside of steady
states. Specifically, embedded within the changes of the support ratio is the presence of a
very large cohort born before the introduction of the pill. Rather than a smooth transition
through many steady state equilibria, the size of this particular single cohort means that
the transition is instead characterized by the rapid accumulation of an enormous quantity
of assets. The implication is a much larger response for real interest rates, which would
otherwise be missed without a full model of the transition dynamics.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion
on the demographic structure of the world’s four biggest economies, the United States, China,
Japan, and Germany. We propose a model of demographics and demonstrate that it can
explain accurately the evolution of demography since 1970. In section 3, we present a simple
model to explain the effect of the large cohort’s savings on real interest rates and the size of
the bubble. In section 4 we set out a general overlapping generations model of real interest
rates. We calibrate this model and simulate the resulting real interest rate transition path.
We conclude in section 5.
2 Demographic transition since the introduction of the
pill
Figure 1 provides the age pyramids for the world’s four largest economies, the United States,
China, Japan, and Germany, in 2014.1
1Figure 1 is taken from http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/age structure.html
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Figure 1: Age pyramids of the world’s four largest economies.
All four graphs reveal a clear difference compared to the traditional graphs that applied
50 years ago and that do still apply for many developing countries: the pyramid has been
replaced by a pillar (but with more mass in the middle section). However, at a more detailed
level, the graphs also reveal clear differences between countries. For the sake of our discussion,
we ignore the top of the pillar above the age of 65, which largely reflects the effect of a
declining fraction of a cohort surviving up until the respective ages. Instead, we focus on
the size of cohorts at lower ages, which largely reflects differences in the number of births
over time, and in some cases subsequent migration flows. First, we may identify the relative
size of the large cohort born before the introduction of the pill, who are aged around 45 in
2014. In each country we see a fall in cohort size as we move ahead in time, although the
depth of this fall varies from country to country. The graph for the United States shows
that they experience the smallest drop in cohort size following the introduction of the pill;
their age pyramid comes closest to the ideal type of a pillar. We see that the biggest cohorts
(age 20-24) are only about 10-15 % larger than the smallest (age 30-39). Moreover, cohort
size does not reveal a clear systematic pattern over time, fluctuations being more or less
erratic. The fall in fertility is offset by an inflow of new migrants, and hence the shape of the
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American age pyramid is therefore largely consistent with a constant growth rate pattern
associated with a stable population.
This is not the case in the other three countries, where roughly speaking, the bottom of
the traditional age pyramid has been replaced not by a pillar but by an inverted pyramid,
resulting in a diamond shape. However, there are clear difference even between these three
countries. Japan stands out as its oldest large cohort (age 60-69) lead the largest cohorts
in China (age 40-49) and Germany (age 45-54) by 20 and 15 years respectively. For Japan,
their large cohort is those who were born in the baby boom immediately after the Second
World War. In all three countries, there is an echo effect of the elderly large cohort some
20 to 25 years later, when the large cohort of fertile women gave rise to a boom in newborn
babies. In Japan today, this echo cohort (in particular age 40-44) is even larger than the
cohort of their parents due to mortality at the higher ages.
Germany stands out as the country among the four with the most clear diamond shape.
After the introduction of the pill in the 1960s, fertility rates dropped by some 30%.2 Again
there is an echo effect some 20 to 25 years later, when the cohort of mothers declines by
30% due to the drop in fertility two decades before, leading to further 30% decline in cohort
size. From then on, cohort size keeps shrinking steadily, since the fertility rate is below
the reproduction rate. Looking in 2014, the smallest cohort is less than 50% of the largest
cohort. We claim that the demographic transition experienced in each of these countries,
particularly so for Germany, can be explained by a simple model of demographics where a
country suffers a fertility shock around the time of the introduction of the pill.
2.1 A model of demographic transition
Suppose that households live for a total of J periods. Define the size of the cohort born at
period t to be Nt. The total population of all those alive at period t is Pt, which is given by
Pt =
J−1∑
i=0
Nt−i. (1)
Those between the ages of F and F are fertile. They determine the size of the newborn
cohort according to
Nt = bt
F−1∑
i=F
Nt−1−i, (2)
2The actual fall in fertility in Germany was even larger, from 2.5 in 1967 to 1.4 1971. However, the
fertility rate was exceptionally high for a short period between 1963 and 1967, being closer to 2 in the years
before. See https://embryology.med.unsw.edu.au/embryology/index.php/Germany Statistics
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where bt is the birth-rate at time t.
From these equations, we may derive the constant rate of population (and cohort size)
growth for a given fixed birth-rate b. By equation 1, we see that if population grows at a
constant rate of gP and cohort size grows at a constant rate of gN , then it must be the case
that gP = gN . From here we shall refer to this common growth rate as simply g. We may
rewrite equation 2 to
b =
1∑F−1
i=F (1 + g)
−i
, (3)
which gives us a monotonically increasing relationship between the birth-rate b and the
constant rate of population growth g.
Now we consider the effect of the pill. Supposing that the population is initially growing
at the constant growth rate associated with b = bH , given by equation 3, we model the effect
of the pill as the following fertility shock
bt =
bH , t < t∗bL t ≥ t∗ , where bH > bL. (4)
Using equation 2, and noting that the initial demographic state was that of constant
growth, we may generate the demographic transition as a result of the introduction of the
pill. In particular we find that in our simulations, the growth rate of the population tends
towards the new constant growth rate given by equation 3 with b = bL. Hence the effect
of the pill on demography is a transition from the initial state of constant high population
growth, to the eventual state of low constant growth.
2.1.1 Calibration to Germany
We apply our demographic model of the pill to compare the Germany in 2014. Taking
the fertile sub-population to be those between the ages of 18 to 28, we begin under the
assumption that the country was initially growing at the constant rate consistent with a
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 2.5. We model the fertility shock as a sudden drop in TFR
from 2.5 to 1.4 in the year of 1970 (see figure 2). Figures 2 and 3 below show the fit of our
demographic model.
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Figure 2: Germany’s TFR and the impact of the pill.
9
Figure 3: Germany’s age distribution in 2014.
Looking at figure 2, we see that our assumption of a sudden fertility matches closely the
data of Germany’s TFR. In addition, from figure 3 we see that this simple fact can accurately
explain the German age distribution in 2014, within the framework of our demographic
model.
The important point to note is that the current age structure, in terms of its ratio
between those approaching retirement to those who are young, is yet more extreme than the
long-run state of constant rate population decay. Figure 4 contrasts the eventual constant
rate of population decay, with our model’s age distribution for Germany in 2014. We see in
this comparison just how far off the current age distribution is, relative to even the case of
constant population decay - there is considerably less mass in the young cohorts’ part of the
Germany’s age distribution. This highlights the relative size of the large cohort born before
the pill, and the relative scarcity of the absorbers of their savings (the younger cohorts). The
implication is that our current demographic structure is intensely biased towards saving. Our
hypothesis in this paper is that this transitional phenomenon has profound macroeconomic
implications.
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Figure 4: Germany’s age distribution in 2014, contrasting with the eventual state of popu-
lation decay.
This paper investigates the implications of this transitional age structure for the evolution
of the real interest rate and house prices. We take this stylized model for Germany as a point
of departure. Germany is not the only country in the Euro-zone facing this age structure. The
graphs for Spain, Italy, The Netherlands, and Belgium look similar, somewhat more extreme
for Spain and Italy, somewhat less extreme for The Netherlands and Belgium. Only France
has a substantially different structure, similar to the pillar shape observed for the United
States. To the extent that the Euro-zone has a closed capital market, our analysis therefore
applies to the Euro-zone as a whole. The previous discussion suggests that this demographic
pattern holds for Japan and China too, but with two differences, one in timing and another
in magnitude. Regarding the timing: Japan runs 15 years ahead of Germany (and the rest
of Euro-zone, except for France). Hence, if our analysis of the impact of demography covers
an important driver of the macroeconomy, the evolution of Japan provides a nice laboratory
for the future of the Euro-zone. China, for that matter, lags 5 years behind the Euro-zone.
Regarding the magnitude: the magnitude of the distortion to age structure, in Germany and
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the Euro-zone, dwarfs that of Japan. Hence, if Japan is a good a laboratory for the future
of the Euro-zone, the effects will be much larger there in the Euro-zone than in Japan.
3 A simple model of transition dynamics
In this section we present the most simple model that demonstrates still the main mechanisms
of our paper, namely that the savings of the large cohort leads to a period of acute asset
shortage, which results in both a fall in the real interest rate and the growth of a bubble.
Our model considers households that live for two periods. In the first period of their lives
the households work and earn an income, some of which they must look to save in order
to finance consumption in the second period (in retirement). The fertility shock leads to a
disproportionately large cohort born just before the introduction of the pill, which we model
in our two-generation economy as a one-period positive shock to cohort size. We show that
the saving of the large cohort leads to a fall in real interest rates and an increase in the price
of the bubble.
A household born in period τ has a CES utility function
Uτ =

cτ,01−θ
1−θ + β
cτ,11−θ
1−θ for θ 6= 1
log(cτ,0) + βlog(cτ,1) for θ = 1
,
where cτ,i denotes the consumption of the cohort born in period τ at age i. This leads
to the following Euler equation
cτ,1 = β
1/θ(1 + rτ )
1/θcτ,0. (5)
Capital fully depreciates between each period, hence
Kt+1 = It,
where It is the level of capital investment in period t.
Production is Cobb-Douglas with respect to capital and labor
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t ,
and perfect competition in the capital market gives
kt =
(
α
rt + 1
) 1
1−α
, (6)
12
where kt is the level of capital per worker.
Perfect competition in the labor market gives wages as a function of capital per worker
wt = αk
α−1
t , (7)
which is implicitly a function of rt−1 according to equation 6.
As a benchmark we begin by considering the case of a constant population. In this
example, g = 0, and hence the dynamically efficient real interest rate is r = 0. Note that
although this r = g equilibrium always exists, it is not the only possible equilibrium. In a
situation of asset shortage, r is smaller than g, the economy is dynamically inefficient, and
integenerational transfers from the young to the old in each period, or alternatively trade in
bubbles, increases the welfare of all future cohorts. In a situation of asset surplus, r is greater
than g, and this situation is less easily resolved as you cannot improve all cohorts’ welfare by
saving more (as there is a welfare loss for the first cohort who saves more). Nonetheless the
r = g equilibrium is attractive as it maximizes the welfare of the representative household. In
the case of our simple model, the only concern is the possibility of asset shortage. Whether
or not a bubble is required to generate this equilibrium depends on if capital provides a
sufficient store of value for the young cohort’s savings. By solving for the supply of saving
at r = 0 using equation 5, and comparing with the capital stock at r = 0, we arrive at the
following condition for when there is a sufficient store of value (without a bubble)
1− α
α
β
1 + β
≤ 1. (8)
Our condition is exactly the same as (3.A22) in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), when
letting g = 0 and δ = 1. The condition is more likely to hold for a high capital share α, and
for a low β. Note as g = 0 in this example, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/θ,
does not affect this condition. Specifically for α = 0.3 and β = 1, this condition does not
hold and hence a bubble is required for generating the dynamically efficient outcome.
A rational bubble, with fundamental value zero, provides the remaining store of value
when equation 8 does not hold. Taking the supply of the bubbly asset to be fixed at 1, the
size of the bubble is equal to its price pt. Rational bubbles appreciate at the rate of the real
interest rate, hence
pt+1 = (1 + rt)pt. (9)
As in Samuelson (1958), trade in the bubble can generate the efficient r = g outcome
despite the bubble having no fundamental value. We suppose that in our case of a constant
population, the size of the bubble is such that we have the dynamically efficient r = 0
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equilibrium.
Next we look to analyze the effect of the introduction of the pill within the framework
of our simple model. In our simple model it is not sufficient to consider a sudden drop in
the birth-rate. Consider for example the following demographic model in our simple two
generations model: Nt = btNt−1. Because households live only for two periods, a drop in
the birth-rate leads to the immediate adjustment of cohort size growth to the new lower
level. This misses the entirety of the demographic transition to the new constant growth
rate, namely the presence of the large cohort born before the shock. That is not to say that
the cohort born before the shock is not “larger”: assuming bt fell from b
H > 1 to bL < 1 the
cohort born before the shock is still larger than those born before or after. However they
are not “large” in the sense that this cohort is exactly the size you would expect them to be,
given the size of the next cohort and the rate of population decay. The presence of the large
cohort is important as otherwise the transition to the new growth rate would be a simple
gradual convergence process. It is exactly the perverse demographic transition that drives
the magnitude of the response for the real interest rate, resulting in a real interest rate fall
that overshoots the new BGP level (see section 4). For this reason we consider the following
demographic shock to analyze the effect of the pill within our simple model.
Suppose initially that cohort size is at a constant level of NL which we normalize to 1.
At time t∗ there in a one-period increase in cohort size to NH = 1.5. After t∗ cohort size
returns to the original constant level of NL. This is summarized by
Nt =
NH = 1.5 t = t∗NL = 1 t 6= t∗. (10)
The cohort of size NH is the large cohort born before the pill. The cohorts born before or
after are smaller by a factor of 1/3, which matches approximately the relative sizes of cohorts
we see in many countries. For simplicity, we consider constant population both before and
after the shock. This corresponds to a population growth rate of 0, which means that the
BGP both before and after has a constant size of the bubble (without exponential growth
or decay), with the same dynamically efficient real interest rate of r = 0.
Because the increase in cohort size is known to be transitory to the large cohort, they are
aware that the supply of savings they generate is large relative to what the smaller future
generations can absorb. We shall show that the savings supply of the large cohort has two
consequences. Firstly, the increase in savings leads to a fall in its return. Hence real interest
rates fall as the large cohort accumulates assets for retirement. Secondly, the increase in
savings makes the shortage of assets problem even more acute. Hence the bubble needs to
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appreciate if it is to facilitate the savings of the large cohort.
With the arrival of new information, we allow the size of the bubble to jump at time t∗.
This can be interpreted as coordination of the large cohort to raise the size of the bubble to
a new level. Thereafter the size of the bubble evolves according to equation 18. To analyze
the effect of this shock, we look to find the size of the bubble required at time t∗ so that
eventually the transition path brings economy back to the r = 0 equilibrium. While this
transition path, associated with this particular size of the bubble, is just one of the many
that are feasible, it has several attractive features that make it insightful to study. Firstly,
this is the only transition path that eventually tends to the pre-shock dynamically efficient
steady state equilibrium (with r = 0). Secondly, this transition path dominates, in terms of
efficiency, all other feasible transition paths. To see this, first note that a larger bubble must
eventually lead to a real interest rate of greater than 0. Following the argument in Tirole
(1985), whenever rt exceeds g = 0 it must be the case that the bubble is unstable, violating
the resource constraint in some future period. Hence all other feasible transition paths have
a smaller size of the bubble at time t∗. With a smaller bubble at time t∗, we therefore have a
path for real interest rates that is lower at every time period. For any individual cohort, the
loss from the lower return on savings dominates the gain from higher income when working.
Hence the fall in real interest rates constitutes a net utility loss for each cohort.
3.1 Transition path simulations
Figure 5 shows the transition path in our simple model, under our baseline parameter spec-
ification of (α, β, θ) = (0.3, 1, 2). With the arrival of the shock at time t∗ = 0, the savings
of the large cohort pushes down the return to capital and hence the real interest rate. The
acute asset shortage in this period also manifests itself by an increase in the size of the
bubble. The greater size of the bubble acts to accommodate the savings of the large cohort
by generating larger young-to-old transfers. With the passage of time, the effect of the shock
dies out and real interest rates gradually recover to the pre-shock steady state level. Likewise
the size of the bubble evolves according to equation 18 and returns to the pre-shock steady
state level.
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Figure 5: Real interest rate and size of bubble transition for (α, β, θ) = (0.3, 1, 2).
The effect of the bubble is to reduce the fall in real interest rates in response to the shock
from the pill. As discussed earlier, this makes retirement consumption cheaper relative to
without the bubble, and this effect dominates the increase in wages due to a higher level of
capital. Hence the bubble results in a net gain in welfare for all future cohorts. The increase
in the size of the bubble means that the large cohort buys the assets from the previous
generation at an inflated price. Nonetheless they are willing to do this, even despite the
fact that the return on the bubble is negative, as they benefit by spreading the cost of their
consumption shortage in retirement among all future cohorts. The windfall profit obtained
by the last generation before the shock can be understood as a consumption smoothing tax
on the large cohort, which the large cohort gladly pays in return for using the bubbly asset
for consumption smoothing. In this light our bubble generates a smooth redistribution of
wealth as the result of general equilibrium effects, and not as a result of government enforced
transfers.
Regarding timing, the sharp response of real interest rates and the size of the bubble in
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period t∗ corresponds to the years that the large cohort is active on the labor market and
saving for retirement. As the large cohort is born just before 1970, period t∗ maps to a
decrease in real interest rates and an increase in the price of the bubble over the period from
1985 to 2035. This fits broadly our experience over the past several decades, and specifically
the exact transition of real interest rates will be examined closely in the next section.
While the households in this simple model are fully rational, the growth of the bubble in
period t∗ is not a feature that is explained by rational expectations. As previously discussed
in the introduction, a rational bubble grows at the real interest rate. Hence a growing
bubble is inconsistent with falling, and especially negative, real interest rates. In our simple
model we abstract from this issue because in period t∗ the size of the bubble is allowed
to jump with the arrival of new information. Therefore the growth of the bubble in this
period is not constrained to follow the rational expectations condition. In a full model with
a finer discretization of time, this would not be so. Furthermore, the same critique would
apply to any rational model that seeks to accompany falling real interest rates and a bubble
that grows at an accelerating pace. In order to account for this phenomenon, one would
need to introduce some kind of bounded rationality in the form of limited information. For
example this could come from speculative expectations, or a process gradual learning. For
our analysis we remain agnostic towards what explains the growth. Nonetheless we offer an
explanation for the fundamental causes behind the growth of bubbles during the transition
period, namely that in order to facilitate the savings of the large cohort a transitory period of
greater intergenerational transfers is required. A period of greater intergenerational transfers
is exactly what is delivered by the growth of a bubble.
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Figure 6: The effect of α and θ on transition dynamics.
Figure 6 shows how the transition dynamics are affected if we change our baseline pa-
rameter specification. The blue line remains always the transition path of our baseline
specification with (α, β, θ) = (0.3, 1, 2). We look to analyze the effect of deviations in the α
and θ parameters. An increase in α increases the capital share of income, and hence increases
the productivity of capital. This makes capital a better store of value, and we see this in the
(α, β, θ) = (0.4, 1, 2) simulation as the size of the bubble is smaller both in the steady states
and in the transition periods.3 Furthermore in this transition the real interest rate fall is
also smaller. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/θ, measures the degree to which
households are willing to substitute consumption across time (in response to intertemporal
price changes). Although empirical estimates agree on 1/θ being at around 1/2, the widely
used Cobb-Douglas utility function corresponds to an elasticity of 1/θ = 1. The implication
of this assumption is that the income and substitution effects of real interest rate changes
cancel out for savings supply; that is to say when the returns to retirement savings falls,
households do not substitute towards saving more. Figure 6 shows the consequences of this
assumption. The responses of both real interest rates and the size of the bubble is larger for
the more realistic parameter specification with θ = 2. Note however that θ does not affect
the size of the bubble in the steady state equilibrium, unlike for parameter α.
3For (α, β, θ) = (0.4, 1, 2), condition 8 is not met and hence a bubble (albeit smaller) is still required to
generate the r = g equilibrium. For (α, β, θ) = (0.5, 1, 2), condition 8 is now met and there is no bubble in
either the steady states nor the transition.
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4 Real interest rate numerical simulations
We begin by laying the foundations of a general overlapping generations model. With this
framework we first calibrate this model for Germany, and then use it to generate a detailed
simulation for the path of the market-clearing real interest rates during the transition period
of interest.
Firms produce output subject to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function. Production takes two inputs, capital and labor, and exhibits constant returns to
scale (CRTS):
Yt =

(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)L
σ−1
σ
t
) σ
σ−1
for σ 6= 1
Kαt L
1−α
t for σ = 1
(11)
In the CES production function, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
is σ, where the limiting case of σ equal to 1 gives the Cobb-Douglas production function.
Furthermore the limiting case of α equal to 0 gives the endowment income special case.
Capital accumulates according to
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt,
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate of capital, and It is capital investment in period t.
The first order condition (FOC) of equation 11 with respect to capital, under perfect
competition in the capital rental and capital investment market gives
rt−1 + δ =
αk
− 1
σ
t
[
αk
σ−1
σ
t + 1− α
] 1
σ−1
for σ 6= 1
αkα−1t for σ = 1
, (12)
and the FOC with respect to labor, under perfect competition in the labor market gives
wt =
(1− α)
[
αk
σ−1
σ
t + 1− α
] 1
σ−1
for σ 6= 1
(1− α)kαt for σ = 1
(13)
where kt denotes the level of capital per worker.
Next, we take our demographic model in section 2 to generate the transition of cohort sizes
following the introduction of the pill. Households live for a total of J periods; a household
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born in period τ has the following utility function
Uτ =

∑J−1
i=0 β
i c
1−θ
τ,i
1−θ for θ 6= 1∑J−1
i=0 β
ilogcτ,i for θ = 1
,
where again cτ,i denotes the consumption of the cohort born in period τ at age i. We assume
that households have access to a complete and perfect capital market, where they have the
option of intertemporal trade through the purchase or selling of a one-period bond at the
market real interest rate.4 This utility function generates the following Euler equation
cτ,i+1 = β
1/θ(1 + rτ+i)
1/θcτ,i, (14)
which differs from the Euler equation in section 3 only due to the fact that a household’s
age, i, can now be greater than 1.
Each household receives a unitary labor endowment each period between entering the
labor market at age χ, and leaving the labor market in retirement at age ψ. Households
derive no utility from leisure, and hence they inelastically supply their labor to firms at the
going market wage. Each household therefore earns a labor income for a total of ψ − χ
periods, with life-time income for a household born at period τ being given by
Wτ =
ψ−1∑
i=χ
Pτ,iwτ+i,
where wage at time t is given by equation 13, and Ps,i is the intertemporal price of period
s+ i consumption in terms of period s income:
Ps,i =
i−1∏
j=0
(1 + rs+j)
−1.
The life-time budget constraint of a household born at period τ is given by
J−1∑
i=0
cτ,iPτ,i ≤ Wτ . (15)
4The assumption of trade through only one-period bonds simplifies our analysis at the exact moment of
the fertility shock. During normal periods this assumption has no effect as each household can replicate any
allocation achievable through general n-period bonds. However at the moment of the shock our assumption
means that the household wealth effect of the shock is simply the change in the household’s future discounted
labor income. From this we are able to derive the exact consumption profile of each household in response
to the surprise shock.
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Finally the solution of the household’s problem is given by the combination of the budget
constraint in equation 15, and the Euler equation(s) given by equation 5.
Theorem 1. Supposing that the population is growing at a constant rate of g. Assuming
that g > −δ, then there always exists a balanced growth path equilibrium characterized by a
real interest rate of r = g.
Theorem 1 states that when the size of the population grows at a constant rate of g, there
always exists a balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium where the real interest rate exactly
equals the population growth rate. The proof of existence for the r = g equilibrium in our
general framework is given in our appendix; it follows approximately the argument given by
Samuelson (1958), although he considers only the case of a two generation economy. Now we
apply this to our demographic model of Germany from section 2, where those between the
ages of 18 and 28 are fertile and each household lives for a total of 75 years. We begin with
the r = g BGP equilibrium for Germany which runs until the fertility shock which we take
to occur in 1970. In 1970, the TFR suddenly falls from 2.5 to 1.4, and cohort size begins its
transition towards the new lower (and negative) population growth rate. Our objective now
is to calculate the real interest rate transition from the year 1970, as the population and the
economy transitions towards the new BGP equilibrium.
The calculation of the transition path towards the new BGP equilibrium is highly non-
trivial. Our baseline specification considers households that live for a total of 75 periods, and
because each household is perfectly forward looking their consumption in each time period
depends on the entire future path for real interest rates. We design an iterative adjustment
algorithm that exploits the shared Euler equation of each household to narrow in on the
equilibrium real interest rate path. The details of our algorithm is given in our appendix.
Below we show our results for the baseline specification of Germany. For the total 75
periods (years), a household enters the labor market at age 20 and retires at age 65. We take
β = 1, δ = 0.075, the elasticity of capital labor substitution to be σ = 0.4, and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution to be 0.5 (i.e. θ = 2).5
5See Chirinko (2004), Havra´nek (2015) and Nadiri (1996) for estimates of the baseline specification
parameters.
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Figure 7: The demographic effect of the pill over a long horizon.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of cohort size after the introduction of the pill in 1970, over
a very long horizon. Before the pill, population was growing at a constant rate of 1%. After
the pill, the growth rate shall eventually converge to a constant decline of 1.5% per annum.
However, due to persistence of the cohort distribution, it takes a significant amount of time
before the economy converges to that new growth rate. After the introduction of the pill,
there is an immediate steep decline, followed by a gradual increase because the size of the
cohorts of mothers is still increasing. However after another 20 years or so, smaller cohorts
enter the group of fertile women and hence cohort size starts declining again.
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Figure 8: The evolution of the real interest rate over a long horizon.
Figure 8 shows the trajectory of the real interest rate for the baseline parameter spec-
ification. Initially, the real interest rate moves up. The composition of the population is
hardly affected at that time since the number of smaller cohorts is still low, however the
older cohorts feel richer because they realize that in subsequent periods the size of the co-
horts borrowing for their education goes down, relaxing the tension on the goods market
and making their claim of future output more valuable. Hence, they increase consumption,
which drives up the real interest rate. From about 1985 onwards, the interest rate starts
declining steeply, from 1.5% to -2% in 2035. What is striking is the length of the period for
which the real interest rate declines. The downward pressure continues well into the 2030s
when the large cohort begins to retire, and the depth of the trough significantly overshoots
below the new BGP level.
After 2035, there is some recovery up to the level of the new BGP level, but this is only
temporary as this uptick is just part of some residual cyclicality from the initial demographic
shock. Each time when the original small cohort born just after the shock gives rise to a
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new generation, there is another small fall in cohort size which is reflected in a fall in real
interest rates. The length of one cycle is in our case is 23 years, which is the average age of
a mother and hence the length of one generation. The shock’s effect dampens quickly as the
cohort size distribution tends to the new constant growth rate. This process is more-or-less
complete by the year 2150.
Figure 9: The effect of retirement age and longevity on the real itnerest rate transition.
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Figure 10: The effect of θ on the real interest rate transition.
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Figure 11: The effect of σ on the real interest rate transition.
A comparison of the trajectories for alternative parameter specifications provides an
insight to the causes of the real interest rate fall and its depth. The trough in real interest
rates is deeper for a longer longevity (holding retirement age constant), a lower retirement
age (holding life expectancy constant), a lower elasticity of capital labor substitution, and
for a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution. None of these results come as a surprise.
The first two facts are due to the resulting change to the number of years in retirement
(which households need to save for). More years of retirement means a deeper fall in the real
interest rate. In addition a higher retirement age postpones the timing of the trough since
the large cohort continues the accumulate financial assets for a longer period. The effect
of the elasticity of capital labor substitution matters, but not very much unless one really
moves towards a Cobb-Douglas production function with the elasticity of substitution equal
to unity. The cyclicality of the path becomes more pronounced for low values of the elasticity
of substitution, as in these cases physical capital is less able to act as an external dampener
to the variations in saving. Variations in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution matter
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much more. A low elasticity (and therefore a high θ) means that households are less able
to tolerate variation in consumption - hence this results in a deeper trough as households
continue to save even when the return is strongly negative. For example for θ = 4, the
trough is much deeper and the shock takes much longer to fade out.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the fall in real interest rates and the growth of bubbles, in
particular in housing, can both be explained by demographic changes as a result of the
introduction of the pill. These demographic patterns are to varying degrees present in all
high-income countries, and also China. This points to the conclusion that without some
reversal of fertility rates, or a dramatic technological breakthrough, low interest rates are
here to stay until at least around 2035. Specifically, Japan’s demographic profile leads that
of the western world by about 15 years, and we see that Japan has not escaped from its
situation of low interest rates since it entered this period in the early 1990s.
Our analysis finds that the growth of a bubble during this transition period to lower
growth may well be welfare-improving. By providing a much needed store of value in a period
of acute asset-shortage, they help accommodate for the savings of the large cohort born before
the pill. Although we find a case for the efficiency of a larger bubble during the transition, the
actual process of growth appears to be inconsistent with rational expectations. Some form of
bounded rationality is required to generate the growth of a bubble simultaneous to a fall in
the real interest rate. Likewise psychological factors were probably at play. Further research
on what could explain the mechanism of growth would be insightful for academic interest
and policy alike. Nonetheless, policy that stifle the bubble in this transition process without
providing an alternative only acts to prevent households from smoothing consumption. This
will result in a deeper fall of real interest rates. In this light, there is a need for future
study to find which policies are appropriate in this transition period of high savings, so that
they generate the desirable effects of trade in bubbles but without the associated financial
instability.
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Appendix
Proof of theorem 1
Proof. We look to first prove theorem 1 for the special case of an endowment economy
with α = 0. Using this result we shall generalize to general well-behaved CRTS production
economies, which completes our proof.
We begin in our endowment income special case. First suppose that households are given
the option to smooth their consumption across their life-times at the real interest rate g. This
gives a set of desired intertemporal transfers for the representative household (representative
as we consider a BGP). Suppose we start initially with no intertemporal transfers, so that
for certain aggregate consumption equals aggregate income. We may introduce one desired
intertemporal transfer at a time. For example suppose that each household wants to borrow
one unit of consumption in the first period to be repaid by 1 + g units of consumption in the
second period. This transfer would lead to an expansion of the age one cohort’s consumption
by 1, and a decrease of the age two cohort’s consumption by 1+g. Because cohort sizes grow
at rate g, this transfer does not break market-clearing. As each individual transfer does not
break market-clearing, implementing the entire set of desired intertemporal transfers still
maintain market-clearing. At this final allocation, each household is maximizing its utility
subject to the real interest rate g, and we still have market-clearing, hence r = g generates
a BGP equilibrium.
Next we consider a CRTS production economy. We begin by supposing the BGP equi-
librium real interest rate was g. We need to verify firstly market-clearing, and secondly the
maximization of utility for the representative household.
r = g implies a constant level for the level of capital per worker, and hence the equilibrium
wage w. This means that the households labor income is equivalent to receiving a fixed
income endowment of w in each period. We know from the endowment economy special
case that aggregate consumption demand from all households, in a BGP with r = g, gives
market-clearing in the endowment economy. This means that aggregate consumption must
equal to aggregate labor income, which is w times the labor force.
Next, we use the fact that CRTS production functions allows us to decompose aggregate
income exactly into aggregate labor income and aggregate capital income. We know that
aggregate consumption equals to aggregate labor income. Therefore to show market-clearing,
it suffices to show that aggregate capital income equals to aggregate investment.
Aggregate investment in the BGP must maintain the constant level of capital per worker
implied by the real interest rate of g. Therefore we may write aggregate investment as the
following function of the aggregate capital stock:
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It = (g + δ)Kt. (16)
Likewise from the no-arbitrage condition on capital investment, it follows that
r + δ = ∂Yt/∂Kt.
However under our initial assumption, r = g, therefore it follows that ∂Yt/∂Kt = g + δ.
Substituting ∂Yt/∂Kt for g + δ in equation 16 shows that aggregate capital income (RHS)
equals to aggregate investment (LHS). This verifies that we have market-clearing, and hence
we conclude that r = g generates a BGP equilibrium in the production economy.
Analytical solution for the simple model with C-D production
We consider an alternative specification of the simple two generation model, where we assume
that the news of the demographic shock arrives before the consumption decisions at time
t = −2 are made. This seems an unnatural assumption but it has the advantage that we
can separate between the effect of the news and the effect of the adjustment itself, because
at t = −2, the demographic shocks has no direct impact on the interest rate other than its
effect of future interest rates. How will the economy deal with this shock?
For the sake of the exposition, we focus on the simplest case with Cobb Douglas prefer-
ences and technology θ = σ = 1 and full depreciation δ = 1. In that case
y = αα/(1−α), k = α1/(1−α).
Furthermore, we focus on the case of asset shortage and hence trade in bubbly assets at the
GGR path
α
1− α <
β
1 + β
,
see equation 8. The size of the bubble satisfies
p =
(
β
α
1− α
1 + β
− 1
)
k. (17)
During the transition path, a rationale bubbles appreciates at the rate of the real interest
rate
pt+1 = (1 + rt)pt. (18)
Hence, pt+1 is the price retirees receive at period t for the bubbly assets and which they can
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use for consumption at time t.
An equilibrium is a path for rt for all t ≥ −1 and the resale value of the bubble at t = −2,
p−1, that satisfies6
1 =
α
γ
(
1 +
p−1
k
)
+
α
γ
(1 + r−1)
1/(α−1) , (19)
(1 + r−1)
α/(α−1) =
β
γ
1− α
1 + β
(1 + r−1) +
α
γ
(1 + r0)
1/(α−1)NH ,
(1 + r0)
α/(α−1) =
β
γ
1− α
1 + β
(1 + r0) (1 + r−1)
α/(α−1)N−1H +
α
γ
(1 + r1)
1/(α−1)N−1H ,
(1 + r1)
α/(α−1) =
β
γ
1− α
1 + β
(1 + r1) (1 + r0)
α/(α−1)NH +
α
γ
(1 + r2)
1/(α−1) ,
and
(1 + rt)
α/(α−1) =
β
γ
1− α
1 + β
(1 + rt) (1 + rt−1)
α/(α−1) +
α
γ
(1 + rt+1)
1/(α−1) , for t > 1, (20)
where γ ≡ 1− 1−α
1+β
. All these equations have the same structure:.the left hand side is current
output minus consumption of the current cohort of workers, the first term on the right hand
side is consumption of retirees, and the second term on the right hand side is investment in
next period’s capital stock.
In the second line of 19, the demographic shock raises investment demand (resource
shortage); in the third line, the demographic shock reduces consumption of retirees and
investment relative to the current size of the workforce (resource abundance); in the third
6Since kt+1 = It/Nt and
ct,0 =
1
β + 1
wt,
ct−1,1 =
β
β + 1
(1 + rt)wt−1,
equation ??, ??, and ?? can be written as
kαt = ct,0 + ct−1,1
Nt−1
Nt
+ kt+1
Nt+1
Nt
,
kt = k (1 + rt)
1/(α−1)
,
wt =
1− α
α
(1 + rt) kt = (1− α) y (1 + rt)α/(α−1) .
Defining γ = 1− 1−α1+β and substitution of the last two equations in the first yields
(1 + rt)
α/(α−1)
=
β
γ
1− α
1 + β
(1 + rt) (1 + rt−1)
α/(α−1) Nt−1
Nt
+
α
γ
(1 + rt+1)
1/(α−1) Nt+1
Nt
.
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line the demographic shock raises consumption of retirees (resource shortage). The first line
of 19 deviates for two reasons. First, the capital labour ratio is at its steady state value,
k−2 = k since it was decided on before the information on the demographic shock arrived.
Hence the reward for the factors of production is at its GGR value, so that r−2 = 0. Second,
consumption of retirees is equal to the return to the capital stock, (1 + r−2) k−2 = k, plus
the resale value of the bubbly assets bought last period, p−1.
Equation 20 is a second order difference equation. It has an analytical solution7
1 + rt = C
αt ,
where C is a constant of integration. For any α in the unit interval, 1 + rt converges to unit
for t → ∞ and hence r∞ = 0, which is the GGR equilibrium. Hence, equation 18 can be
rewritten as
p
p−1
= ∞t=2C
αt
t=−1
1 (1 + rt) = C
A
t=−1
1 (1 + rt) ,
A ≡ α
2
1− α.
Substitution of 17 yields
p−1
k
=
(
β
α
1− α
1 + β
− 1
)
C−At=−1
1 (1 + rt)
−1 . (21)
The system 19 and 21 is a system of five equation, which can be solved for its five unknowns:
r−1,..., r1, p−1 and C, using 1 + r2 = Cα
2
.
Endowment economy algorithm
First we describe the special endowment income case, where α = 0. As an analytic solution
is unavailable, instead we look to numerically compute the transitional equilibrium. To do
this, we exploit the Euler equation on an aggregate level to design an iterative algorithm,
7
v1+at+1 = bvt+1v
1+a
t + cv
a
t+2
vt = Ah
mt
A(1+a)hm(1+a)m
t
= bAhmm
t
A(1+a)h(1+a)m
t
+ cAahm
2amt
m =
1 + a
a
= α
A = bA2 + c⇒ A = 1
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which we find converges to the transition path for real interest rates. The key idea is that
each household has consumption that grows between any two adjacent periods by a factor of
β1/θ(1 + rt)
1/θ. If supposing we had market-clearing in any one period, then the real interest
rate that guarantees market-clearing in the next period must be approximately the rt such
that Yt+1 = Ytβ(1 + rt). This relation is not exact as in the next period, one cohort exits
the population and another cohort enters the population. To derive the exact relation, note
that aggregate consumption must match aggregate income Yt. Therefore it follows that the
equilibrium real interest rate in period t satisfies:
Yt+1 −Nt+1ct+1,0 = β1/θ(1 + rt)1/θ(Yt −Nt+1−Jct+1−J,J−1) (22)
Yt − Nt+1−Jct+1−J,J−1 is the total consumption of all households in period t that will
continue to live to the next period, and Yt+1−Nt+1ct+1,0 is the consumption of all households
in period t+1 who were also alive the last period. This removes the part of aggregate income
in period t that is consumed by the exiting cohort, and the part of aggregate income in period
t+ 1 that is consumed by the entering cohort. Therefore β1/θ(1 + rt)
1/θ now gives the exact
growth rate of the non-exiting consumption.
Our algorithm, for the endowment case, successively calculates the real interest rate
transition using equation 22, within the limits of a transition window. We set real interest
rates before the transition window to be the initial BGP level of gH , and the real interest
rates after the window to be the terminal BGP level gL. Between the two BGP’s we allow for
a transition window of tJ periods, where t is an integer parameter we specify. The goal is to
set t large enough so that there are sufficiently many periods for the transition to play out in
full, but small enough so that the problem does not become too intensive computationally.
Our algorithm updates its calculation for the transition path every iteration. For any
given iteration, and for each transition period within the transition window, we firstly need
to calculate Yt −Nt+1−Jct+1,0 and Yt+1 −Nt+1ct+1,0. While Yt and Yt+1 do not change with
respect to the real interest rate path, Nt+1ct+1,0 and Nt+1−Jct+1−J,J−1 is a function of the
real interest rate. We therefore need to solve the household’s problem for both the exiting
cohort and the entering cohort to find these quantities, but we do not yet know the true
real interest rate (path). To get around this problem, we calculate these quantities under
the assumption that the interest rate transition is whatever we calculated from the previous
iteration. Now we may calculate rt using equation 22, which we take as the new iteration’s
real interest rate transition. Our algorithm computes additional iteration until the interest
rate path converges. Furthermore we confirm our results by verifying that market-clearing
holds in each period.
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Production economy algorithm
The design of our algorithm for the production economy requires some adjustments from the
endowment economy version. Following from equation 22, we now have
Ct+1(rt, rt+1)−Nt+1ct+1,0 = β1/θ(1 + rt)1/θ(Ct(rt−1, rt)−Nt+1−Jct+1−J,J−1). (23)
Equation 23 differs from equation 22 only in terms of the change from Y to C. C is
aggregate consumption, which replaces Y as there is now the possibility of investment with
capital. C depends on rt as rt determines the capital stock tomorrow and hence investment
today, and C depends on rt−1 as rt−1 gives the capital stock today and hence determines
output today.
While this is a small change in notation, it makes the problem drastically harder to
solve. For example as rt affects both the slope term, β
1/θ(1 + rt)
1/θ, and output both today
and tomorrow, if you simply take output next period as given when calculating rt using
equation 23, you will end up over-adjusting. This is a big problem as over-adjustment
leads to the algorithm’s calculations to quickly explode. The above example is not the only
source of co-dependence from the different terms in equation 23. For each period t which
we look to calculate rt, we can only take rt−1 and rt+1 as given, at the level of whatever the
past iteration’s path gives. But this leads to strange dynamics in the algorithm as once we
calculate correctly the new rt based on this past iteration’s rt−1 and rt+1, the next iteration’s
rt−1 and rt+1 will now be different. Hence we see that the goal posts, i.e. rt−1 and rt+1,
changes each iteration, and there is no guarantee that successive rt calculations will lead to
small adjustments towards the true level - in fact the result again is often explosive. We give
a final example, although there are still more cases: in the production economy the Nt+1ct+1,0
and Nt+1−Jct+1−J,J−1 terms depend on the interest rate path not just through its effect on
intertemporal prices, they also depend on interest rates through wages. This can also lead
to perverse dynamics across iterations, where changes in the households’ income leads to
changes in C, which feeds back upon itself to create explosive behavior in the algorithm.
Altogether all of the above issues compound together to make this calculation much more
difficult.
Through much experimentation, we find one way of updating the transition interest rate
path using equation 23 such that the algorithm is stable and converges, and furthermore
converges to the true path (which we verify by checking market-clearing). The algorithm
has two stages. In stage one: for each iteration and each transition period, we firstly calculate
Nt+1ct+1,0 and Nt+1−Jct+1−J,J−1 by explicitly solving the household problem for the entering
and leaving cohorts. Then we calculate Ct as a function of rt by finding Yt − It. This
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internalizes the effect of rt on Ct from the supply side perspective. For Ct+1, we calculate
aggregate consumption demand in period t + 1 by solving each alive cohort’s household’s
problem in period t, and then aggregating. This serves to anchor Ct+1 to a market-clearing
level, which helps makes the adjustment in rt less volatile. With all of the above terms,
we may now solve equation 23 for rt. Doing this for all periods in the transition window
completes one iteration. We keep running iterations in this stage until it no longer converges
further. Next we move to stage two. Stage two calculates the above terms the same way
except for Ct+1. We now find Ct+1 also in terms of aggregate consumption supply, i.e.
Yt+1 − It+1, and we again internalize the effect of rt on both Yt+1 and It+1. This gives us
a different equation 23 as a function of rt, which we solve. We keep running iterations in
this final stage until the path converges a second time. This completes our algorithm, and
we indeed find that the resulting interest rate path satisfies market-clearing in all transition
periods.
Note that in stage one of the adjustment algorithm, we take Ct+1 to be aggregate con-
sumption demand in period t+1. This requires solving the household problem for households
of all different ages, and then aggregating, and this is done for each period in the transi-
tion window. Furthermore this is repeated in each iteration, which can easily exceed 1000.
The transition window scales with the size of the model, i.e. J , and likewise the number
of differently aged households also scales with J . Finally, it appears that the number of
iterations required also scales with J . This implies that the computational size of the task is
approximately of order J3, which quickly becomes enormous once we start to look calculate
a full overlapping generations model with J = 75. For this reason, the algorithm for the
production economy is very slow to converge.
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